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Abstract
The advanced electric power grid is a complex real-time
system having both Cyber and Physical components.
While each component may function correctly,
independently, their composition may yield incorrectness
due to interference. One specific type of interference is in
the frequency domain, essentially, violations of the
Nyquist rate. The challenge is to encode these signal
processing problem characteristics into a form that can be
model checked. To verify the correctness of the
cyber-physical composition using model-checking
techniques requires that a model be constructed that can
represent frequency interference. In this paper,
RT-PROMELA was used to construct the model, which
was checked in RT-SPIN. In order to reduce the state
explosion problem, the model was decomposed into
multiple sub-models, each with a smaller state space that
can be checked individually, and then the proofs checked
for noninterference. Cooperation among multiple clock
variables due to their lack of notion of urgency and their
asynchronous interactions, are also addressed.
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1. Introduction
The term Cyber-Physical System (CPS) describes a
system that is intimately coupled with the physical world
in space and time and lends itself to hardware/software
co-design and co-analysis techniques [1][2]. This paper
discusses the issues in verifying real-time interactions in
CPSs using model checking techniques, paying particular
attention to the notion of possible interference among the
actions of the various components of the system.
The CPS under consideration is part of a larger project to
design an advanced electric power grid [3]. This is a
reliable self-healing grid in which coordinated cyber
control of power flow control devices plays a significant
role in the system’s operation. Flexible AC Transmission
System (FACTS) devices are one such device that is used
to monitor and adjust the power flows in a power
transmission system in real-time. The need for better
controls has been shown many times, among which the
most serious one is the Northeast blackout 2003 [8].
Mitigating the effects of single contingencies (such as line
failures) is necessary before they cause some combination
of contingencies which can further lead to a cascading
failure scenario in which most or all of a power network
goes down. The advanced electric power grid incorporates
a number of FACTS devices into a power grid network to
act as a distributed, fault-tolerant, and real-time
constrained control system to cooperatively adjust power
flows.
Two important issues that arise during verification of a
CPS include: 1) the interactions among components need
to be expressed so that the absence of undesired behavior
(interference) can be verified, and 2) the resulting state
explosion problem needs to be addressed [4][10]. The
temporal interactions among system components that may
cause negative impact are identified and defined during
the design process.

D/A Output

FACTS

A/D Input

Power System
Simulation Engine

Controllable
Load

Figure 1. Hardware-in-the-Loop Test-bed
Within the cyber domain, noninterference is usually
defined as the absence of race conditions or absence of
violation of component correctness during the
composition of system components. To extend this
concept to the physical domain requires a different line of
thought. The Nyquist rate1 provides an attractive theory
that bridges the two domains to relate cyber and physical
interactions at the Cyber/Physical boundary in terms of
interference between sampling and system frequency
response.
Model checking has been used for the verification of
hardware and software system designs by specifying a
model of the system and its desired properties. In this
paper, a decomposition approach was used to break a
model into smaller ones. The system is naturally
partitioned into a number of high-level models. Only a
subset of the properties is checked for each decomposed
small model and the resulting proofs are checked for
noninterference with overall system correctness. The
decomposed models were verified using RT-SPIN [5], a
real-time extension of SPIN. RT-SPIN uses
RT-PROMELA as the modeling language, which
introduces clock variables for real-time control.

2. Model Problem: Advanced Electric Power
Grid - HIL Test-bed
The specific system treated in this paper is a laboratory
setup of a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Test-bed of a
portion of the advanced electric power grid control system
with FACTS devices [1].
Model checking of
noninterference among the system components is part of
the hardware/software co-analysis and co-design of the
HIL test-bed. As shown in Figure 1, the HIL test-bed
consists of a real-time simulation of the many lines and
buses in an electric power grid, connected to several
physical FACTS devices that interact though a few real
power lines. The simulation controls the power flow
through the power line and interacts with it via A/D Input
and D/A Output; the power line flow is set to that of its
simulated value. The FACTS devices manipulate the
power line at a certain update frequency and the harmonic

1

The Nyquist rate from signal processing work is the rate
at which sampling of a frequency-capped physical signal
such that aliasing does not occur.
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response is bounded by low-pass filters within the device.
As shown in Figure 2, there are two independent
interaction loops in the HIL, one between the FACTS
device and the HIL line, the other between the Simulation
Engine and the HIL line. Each of the interaction loops
involves 1) reading the sensor data and 2) applying the
new calculated settings to the HIL line. Both the FACTS
device and the Simulation Engine are active components
in the system and contain their own computers which take
the sensor readings and calculate the new settings. The
FACTS device calculates new settings in order to modify
the power flow while the Simulation Engine takes the
sensor readings and attempts to calculate the response of
the entire simulated network and its effects on the current
HIL line. The HIL line is an actual power line in the lab
setup which only passively responds to the new settings
from either the FACTS device or the simulation engine.
Due to the asynchronous nature, possible interference that
affects the performance of the HIL Test-bed may exist.
Between the cyber and physical (power system)
components, this interference is in the frequency domain
as follows. The new settings need to be calculated by
either the FACTS device or the Simulation Engine based
on the correct reading of the current status of the HIL line.
In other words, considering that the two interaction loops
are asynchronous and new settings from either side can be
applied to the HIL line in real time, it needs to be ensured
that the sensor reading occurs often enough to capture the
changes. If the sampling is too slow (infrequent), some
frequency modes are lost and the Nyquist rate is violated
– this is defined as interference.
As shown in Figure 2, there are four properties that need
to be checked for possible interference: 1) the FACTS
reading rate vs. the FACTS setting rate, 2) the Simulation
reading rate vs. the Simulation setting rate, 3) the FACTS
reading rate vs. the Simulation setting rate, and 4) the
Simulation reading rate vs. the FACTS setting rate.

Figure 2. Conceptual model of RT-PROMELA model
to be checked

Figure 3. FACTS-HIL and SimEng-HIL Interactions
All four properties are used to ensure that the sensor
reading data from the HIL line used in the calculation of
new settings contains all of the frequency information
present. The interactions between reading and setting
from the FACTS device and the Simulation Engine on the
same HIL line are illustrated in Figure 3. New settings
from the FACTS device are applied to the HIL line every
3.3ms. On the other side, new settings from the
Simulation Engine to set the power line to its simulated
value are applied to the HIL line at a much slower
rate--every 20ms. In order to avoid interference, all four
rates above need to satisfy the Nyquist rate.

3. Model Description
Based on the above understanding of the design as shown
in Figure 2 and Figure 3, models were developed using
RT-PROMELA with assertions to formally check the four
properties by defining processes and clock variables. In
order to reflect the asynchronous nature of the problem,
each of the events should have its own timer. Every
process in the model has a clock variable that works with
its timer to control its event.
Initially, one Comprehensive model including all the
processes and variables was constructed with the hope of
checking all four properties at the same time. Due to the
state explosion problem of model checking, the model
could not be verified using the available computation
resources. Thus, model decomposition was applied and
four smaller models were derived from the
Comprehensive model. They were verified with success.
The following subsections will introduce the
implementation details of the Comprehensive model and
its succeeding decomposition.

3.1. Comprehensive Model
During the construction of the Comprehensive model, in
order to keep track of the various rates, the concepts of
rendezvous channels and circular buffers were used to
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record reading and setting events (similar to the ideas
presented in [9]). Each buffer encodes a different
frequency response through updates by each of the
different clocks, more entries means a faster clock and so
on. Rendezvous channels are used for synchronized
message passing, which represents how the new settings
are applied to the HIL line. The occurrence of an event
can be represented by putting a message on the channel.
Buffers are used on the HIL line side to receive and
record the messages. Each of the four events (two reading
events and two setting events) is assigned one channel
and one buffer. This notion abstracts Error! Reference
source not found. the more complex events inside the
model checker to simple events relating to frequency
interaction,
A buffer contains n slots and a pointer moves along the
slots in the buffer at a certain speed that is no slower than
the fastest event. Each time the pointer moves to the next
slot, the newly pointed slot clears its value to zero (0).
When an event (reading or setting from either the FACTS
device or the simulation engine) is sent and received
through the channel, the value in the current slot of the
corresponding buffer increments by one (1). Otherwise,
the current slot does not change its value.
By keeping the window sizes the same across all four
events, we can count the total values in different sliding
windows and compare them to make sure that the
properties are held under Nyquist rate. In order to check
for interference, a sliding window as shown in Figure 4 is
used in each of the buffers to count the number of
executions of an event over the previous m time slots,
where m is the size of the sliding window. The values in
the sliding windows are counted periodically, for
instance, every time the pointer moves to the next slot. In
order for the Nyquist rate to hold, the count for the sliding
window of a reading event should be at least twice as
large as the count for the sliding window of a setting
event. The Nyquist rate properties are checked by
comparing the counting values for the four events using
the following four assertions:
Assertion 1:
assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_FACTS_sample);
Assertion 2:
assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_SimEng_sample);
Assertion 3:
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_FACTS_sample);
Assertion 4:
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_SimEng_sample);
The reading frequencies for both reading events are 1kHz.
The FACTS device applies new settings to the HIL line at
1kHz filtered down to 300Hz. The frequency for the
Simulation Engine to apply new settings is relatively slow
(50Hz) because it involves the changes in the generator as

well as the programmable load bank. These numbers are
converted into relative values into the RT-PROMELA
models and checked with RT-SPIN. The Comprehensive
model contains the following components:
Procesess:
FACTS_S (sampling process of the FACT device)
FACTS_U (updating process of the FACTS device)
SimEng_S (sampling process of the simulation
engine)
SimEng_U (updating process of the simulation
engine)
HIL (the reception process which simulates the HIL
line and receives all the events through the
channels)
Channels:
E_FACTS_Samples_HIL
E_FACTS_Affects_HIL
E_SimEng_Samples_HIL
E_SimEng_Affects_HIL
Clock Variables:
f_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the FACTS
device sampling)

of the buffer pointer and the sliding window pointer. The
g_clock variable is put inside the HIL process to handle
the task of updating the values in the buffers and
managing the pointers movement for the buffers and the
sliding windows.

3.2. Model Decomposition
The Comprehensive model contains five clock variables
and five processes and we found that the current available
computing resources were not adequate in verifying the
Comprehensive model because of the well-known state
explosion problem in model checking.
The HIL is comprised of a number of high level
components. As the models drill down into lower levels,
for some of the properties to be checked, not all high level
information is required. This decomposition method
resembles the traditional abstraction idea [7] and the
concept of cluster by Basten et al. [6] to a certain extent.
This decomposition combines with the other methods
such as symbolic model checking. A model is first
decomposed to its finest grain—a Decomposed model
does not contain extra processes, variables, etc. in order to
verify a subset of properties. The verifications of the
decomposed models are then combined to imply the
Decomposed model through the noninterference of
proofs.

f_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the
FACTS device updating)
s_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the
simulation engine sampling)
s_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the
simulation engine updating)
g_clock (the clock variable that controls the moving
of buffer pointers)
Timed automata representing the dynamic behavior and
interactions among the five processes were used to help
the construction of the model. The events were governed
by clock variables and the sensor readings and new
settings were represented as synchronization points.
In the model, the sampling and updating events in both
the FACTS device and the simulation engine are
separated because they are asynchronous and their
frequencies are different as shown in Figure 2 and Figure
3. Each channel is designated to one event, either reading
or updating, from one of the two active
components—FACTS device and Simulation Engine. The
clock variables in RT-PROMELA control the frequencies
of the events, one clock variable for each event. The HIL
process does not need a clock variable because it is a
passive component in the system. All it does is to accept
the new settings. The g_clock is used to control the speed
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Figure 5. Decomposed Models
The Comprehensive model is decomposed into smaller
models as introduced above to alleviate the state
explosion problem. There are four properties/assertions to
be checked and each assertion involves the counting
numbers for two events—one for the sampling of sensor
data and the other for the updating of HIL settings. Each
of the four models checks one of the scenarios illustrated
in Figure 5. Thus, if one assertion is checked at a time,

each smaller model will need to include only three
processes, the sampling process, the updating process, and
a third one representing the HIL line to receive the
messages through channels. Three clock variables are
needed--one for each of the two active processes, and a
global clock (g_clock) for the control of the buffer and
sliding window pointers.

frequency is at least twice as high as that of the updating
process.

In order to further simplify the Decomposed
models, the global clock variable for the management of
buffer and sliding window pointers can be combined with
the faster one of the other two clock variables. In each
Decomposed model, there are two clock variables and
three processes. For instance, the Decomposed model that
involves the sensor reading by the FACTS device vs.
applying the new settings from the FACTS device
contains the following important components:
Process:
FACTS_S (sampling process of the FACT device)
FACTS_U (updating process of the FACTS device)

Figure 6. Timed Automaton: FACTS Device Sampling

HIL (the reception process which simulates the HIL
line and receives all the events through the
channels)

Each of the models directly verifies one of the assertions
(1-4) as indicated by (V) in Table 1. However, since the
models are verified independently, there is the possibility
that the individual verifications do not imply correctness
of the Comprehensive model. These possibilities are
indicated by (X).

Channels:
E_FACTS_Samples_HIL
E_FACTS_Affects_HIL
Clock Variables:
f_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the FACTS
device sampling and the moving of the buffer
pointers)
f_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the
FACTS device updating)
Note that the FACTS_S process is in charge of the
sampling of HIL sensor data and is the faster active
process. Thus, its clock variable (f_s_clock) also functions
as the g_clock in the Comprehensive model, which means
that FACTS_S, in addition to its own task of sending
sampling event messages, also needs to update the buffer
and manage the pointers.
Among the three processes, the FACTS_S process is the
most complex one because of its extra responsibility of
controlling the buffer and window pointers as mentioned
above. The timed automaton for the sampling process is
shown in Figure 6. The variable QUIT is used to denote
acceptable end state because of the way clock variables
work in RT-PROMELA. The variable i is the pointer
variable for the buffer and j is the pointer variable for the
sliding window. Code was written following the timed
automaton in Figure 6 and contains an assertion following
the completion of counting to check that the sampling
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To show that the assumptions made by the verification of
the Decomposed Models do not violate the correctness of
the Comprehensive Model, we turn, again, to showing
noninterference now, solely, in the cyber domain,
manually, using the techniques of Owicki and Gries [11].
Lemma 1: The verification of Model a with Assertion 1
does not interfere with the correctness of Assertion 2.
Proof: Using the definition of noninterference where a is
an action and assertion is an assertion of interest, we must
show:
{pre(a) AND assertion} action a {assertion}
For the Comprehensive Model
{pre(Model a) AND Assertion 2} Model a {Assertion 2}
Since Assertion 1 is invariant (by the mechanical
verification) over Model a, we have:
{(Assertion 1: 2*cnt_FACTS_affect <=
cnt_FACTS_sample)
AND Assertion 2: assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect <=
cnt_SimEng_sample)}
Model a {Assertion2: assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect
<= cnt_SimEng_sample)}
Since the clocks and sample rate among all four models

are fixed, Model a’s actions can be considered as
assignments
cnt_FACTS_sample = 1000
cnt_FACTS_affect = 300
With the following implication, the assignment axiom
holds,
{2*300<=1000) AND (2*300<=cnt_SimEng_sample)}
⇒ (2*300<=cnt_SimEng_sample)}
As long as Model b and Model d hold
cnt_SimEng_sample constant, the implication remains
true. 
Theorem 1: The individual verifications of Models a-d
compose to show the Comprehensive Model.
Proof: The remainder of the proofs of individual
noninterference are symmetric to those of Lemma 1.
Since each of Assertions 1-4 remain invariant over Model
a-d executions, the conjunction of Assertions 1-4 remains
invariant over the model executions. 
Table 1. Assertions affected by Models
Model a

Model b

Model c

Assertion 1

V

X

X

Assertion 2

X

V

Assertion 3

X

Assertion 4

Model d

X

X

X

V

Table 2. Costs of Model Verification
Buf.
Size

Win.
Size

Depth
Reached

States
(e+06)

The clock variables in RT-PROMELA have no notion of
urgency. The laziness prevents the triggering of an event
before the clock guard is removed. However, if some
other transition is taking place while the clock guard is
removed, the chance for the event to be triggered is
missed.
This laziness
problem
comes
from
RT-PROMELA and will affect the model to be checked.
To avoid such a problem, this model also checked for the
condition of missing a clock guard. If this happens, the
model goes to an acceptable end state, denoted by the
variable QUIT. This is shown in the timed automaton
(Figure 6). If the value of the clock variable f_s_clock
exceeds the clock guard f_s_timer, the model sets QUIT
to one (1) and goes to an end state. This QUIT is a global
variable and the other processes can check its value.
When the other processes find the value of one (1) in
QUIT, they also go to the acceptable end state. This will
early-terminate some of the execution branches during the
model checking. These acceptable end states are not a
problem with the model but are to avoid the unfavorable
effects brought by the laziness of clock variables in
RT-PROMELA. Excluding the paths with these
acceptable end states will not affect the model checking
result. If the other execution paths all satisfy the asserted
properties, the model is said to be verified. Otherwise,
assertion violation is alerted.
Another issue comes from the way different processes
work asynchronously. Because the message recording and
the movement of buffer pointers are not synchronized
(and this is the desired simulation of the reality), it is
possible for two messages to be recorded in the same time
slot and leaving one slot empty either before or after the
double recording. In this experiment, in order to check the
frequency properties, the assertions are modified by
introducing an offset of one (1). Thus, the following
assertions are used in the models:

X
V

3.3. Other Issues

Mem.
Usage
(e+08)

FS_FU

8

6

574011

2.7551

1.9112

FS_SU

10

8

904673

2.4003

10.977

SS_FU

8

6

574011

2.7551

1.9112

SS_SU

12

10

12817057

3.0549

23.623
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assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_FACTS_sample+1);
assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_SimEng_sample+1);
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_FACTS_sample+1);
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_SimEng_sample+1);

4. Model Verification
The Decomposed models were verified using RT-SPIN
on the Linux server at Peking University. This server was
equipped with 64-bit Power5 microprocessors from IBM
and 12 gigabytes of memory. The results showed that
based on the current values in the system, no interference
was introduced. Table 2 lists the numbers of depth
reached and the amount of memory usage (in Bytes) for
each of the four Decomposed models. These experiments

used the relative timer values based on the numbers in
Figure 2. The sampling timers on the FACTS device side
and the Simulation Engine side were both set to 6; the
timer for updating from the FACTS device was set to 20;
and the timer for the updating from the Simulation Engine
was set to 120.

explosion problem. Automated decomposition may be
possible. In addition, only one interference scenario was
verified in this experiment. With increased semantic
understanding of the advanced electric power grid, more
interference scenarios can be represented as assertions
and integrated with the existing models.

The reason to use different buffer and window sizes in
different experiments as shown in Table 2 was to find out
their effects on the resource usage. These values showed
that due to the existence of the state explosion problem,
the depth and memory usage grow much faster than the
buffer and window size grow. For instance, between the
Decomposed models of SS_SU and FS_SU, the sampling
frequencies (SS and FS) were kept the same and the
updating processes were identical. When the buffer size
was increased from 10 to 12 and the window size was
increased from 8 to 10, the memory usage almost
doubled. The number of depth reached and the number of
states explored both increased by more than 10 times.

6. References

In order to validate the model checking, the timer values
were changed to see the effects to the model. For instance,
if the reading frequency of the FACTS device is lowered
to less than 600Hz, caused by possible scheduling
violation, the Nyquist rate should be violated and possible
incorrect readings will cause inaccurate new settings
In response to this scenario, the timer variable for the
FACTS reading event was raised from 6 to values above
the threshold of 8, such as 10 or 15. As a result, the two
models involving the FACTS reading process (FS_SU
and FS_SU) reported assertion violation. More similar
value adjustments were made in the models and the
results were all correct.

5. Conclusion
The advanced electric power grid is a complex real-time
system. Thus, the temporal interactions among
components need to be carefully examined and verified to
avoid interference among them. This paper introduced a
successful application of model checking on real-time
interference properties using RT-SPIN. The major issue
addressed in the experiment is one type of
frequency-based interference and the verification of the
absence of such interference in the system using model
checking. Some other issues related to the asynchronous
interactions and modeling language were also discussed,
such as the decomposition of the model and the lack of
urgency in clock variables in RT-PROMELA.
Model decomposition is one of many ways to tackle the
state explosion problem in model checking. In this
experiment, the Comprehensive model was decomposed
into smaller sub-models. Memory usage was reduced at
the cost of more models to be checked. This served our
purpose in the experiment by bypassing the state
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